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TAXATIoN-CoNvEYANCE OF IN-OIL PAYmENT RIGTs-CAPrrAL GAiN on

ORDINARY INcom-Taxpayer conveyed to the D. K. Caldwell Foundation, a tax-exempt organization created and controlled by him, payment rights in certain long-life oil fields in return for cash and notes
to be paid from the proceeds of the sales of oil. The conveyances
provided for reversion of the royalty interests when the foundation
had received specified sums. The taxpayer reported as ordinary income the gains resulting from the transactions but later sued for a
refund of the overpayment. He claimed that the conveyances were
sales of capital assets held more than six months under the provisions
of Section 117 j of the INT. 13Ev. CODE of 1939 (substantially the same
as Section 1281 of the INT. 3Ev. CODE of 1954). The Commissioner
argued that the transactions were merely assignments of future income of the taxpayer. Held, the transactions did not constitute anticipatory assignments of future income, but were sales from which the
taxpayer realized capital gain. Caldwell v. Campbell.'
In the instant case, the court was asked to determine whether the
gain resulting from the conveyance of the in-oil payment rights for
cash was taxable as ordinary income or as capital gain. Assignments
of income only have not been effective to transfer taxable income
from the assignor to the assignee, 2 but if the source of the income or
the entire property interest is considered to have been assigned, the
assignee and not the assignor is thereafter taxable on the income from
the property transferred. 3 It also follows that if the entire property
interest has been transferred by sale, the assignor may realize capital
gain rather than ordinary income on such sale if the property sold was
a capital asset. 4 The problem is to draw the line, and this discussion
is limited to the resolution of this problem with regard to in-oil payment rights.
In an early case in which the problem arose,5 the Board of Tax
Appeals ruled that the transfer of a fractional interest in oil property
to a trust, subject to reversion after the trust had realized a stipulated
amount, was to be considered an assignment of corpus and not of
future income. In a subsequent case,6 a sale of a leasehold interest
was held to result in capital gain only where a payment right was
reserved to the seller (no distinction was made as to whether the right
1218 F. 2d 567 (5th Cir., Jan. 12, 1955).

'Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S.

579 (1941).
'Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1936).
"Bells
Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F. 2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
5
R. E. Nail et al Executors (Cook) 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932).
'Commissioner v. Fleming, 82 F. 2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
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was short-lived or long-lived). Still later, the same court 7 held that
the owner of an interest in oil property might carve in-oil payment
rights from that interest and treat the proceeds upon the sale as
capital gain.
Subsequent decisions turned on whether the court found that the
conveyor of oil or gas in place retained an economic interest in the
property conveyed. 8 In one of these decisions, 9 the court looked to
the intention of the parties and found that despite the use of terms
of sale in the agreement, the conveyor had really reserved a royalty
interest in the property conveyed.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that after April 1, 1946
consideration received for the assignment of an in-oil property right
for any period less than the life of the property interest from which
it is carved is ordinary income unless such consideration is pledged
for use in further development.' 0
Subsequently, the court held" that where the conveyance expressly
stipulated that the assignee was not obligated to continue to produce, the conveyance of a mineral property with the retention by the
seller of a royalty interest constituted a sale, and the cash payments
received thereunder were not advance royalties. As a result of the
holding in that case, the General Counsel of the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that an assignment by which the assignor retains an
overriding royalty interest constitutes receipt of advance royal interest
constitutes receipt of advance royalties and not proceeds from the
sale of a capital asset.' 2 In issuing this ruling, he relied on two Supreme Court holdings :1 that income from royalties on oil or gas
leases is taxable as ordinary income; and that, in connection with a
transfer of an oil well lease, retention of a royalty from oil to be produced constitutes withholding of an economic interest in the oil in
place.
In the case under discussion, the Commissioner contended that
since the royalties out of which the in-oil payments arose would have
been income to the grantor when received, the transfers must be
7Ortiz Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 102 F. 2d 508 (5th Cir. 1939).
'Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 459 (5th

Cir. 1941);
Badger Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 791 (5th Cir. 1941); West v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 421, aff'd 150 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945).
SWest v. Commissioner, supra note 8.
''G.C.M.
24849, Cmi. BULL. 1946-1; I.T. 3895, Ctm. BULL. 1948-1; LT.
4003, Cutm. BULL. 1950-1.
3 Arthur N. Trembley, 7 T.C.M. 972 (Dec. 29, 1948).
G.C.M. 27322, Cu'i . BULL. 1952-2.
'

Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 102 (1932); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551

(1933).

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

treated as anticipatory assignments of income. Although he cited no
cases in point, he relied on the holdings of several cases, 14 which held
that where the taxpayer assigns the right to receive income, the income is still taxable to the assignor. The court, however, distinguished
the instant case from the cases relied on by the Commissioner in that
here there was an assignment of the property which produces the
income, not just of the income from that property.
The Commissioner also relied on a case'15 wherein it was held that
where the taxpayer corporation conveyed its entire interest in certain
leases to its stockholders subject to a reversion when the oil payments
received by the stockholders had reached a specific amount, the income was ordinary income to the corporation. The court distinguished the cited case from this case in that the former was over a
short period of time only and was an abortive attempt to reduce taxes.
The Tax Court has previously rejected a contention that the transfer or assignment of an in-oil payment right was an assignment of
future income.' 6 Also, in another Tax Court case,' 7 the taxpayer
carved a right out of the property interest and assigned it only for a
period long enough to pay a contractor for the residence the latter was
constructing for the taxpayer. The court there held that this was
income from the sale of in-oil payment rights and was taxable as
capital gain rather than ordinary income.
The holding in the instant case appears to be a return to the theory
of the holdings in the earlier cases.' 8 It is to be noted, however, that
under the holding in this case, the property interest itself and not the
right alone, must be assigned.
It is submitted that the ruling in the instant case is sound since it
recognizes as a property interest not only the entire in-oil payment
right but also parts of that right carved out of the larger interest. It
is also submitted that the holding in this case may be used in future
cases of transfers of property wherein a reversionary interest is reserved.
George Washington University
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